OmniVira

Literature detail

Transmission dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus at the wildlife-poultry-environmental interface: A case study.

Jolene A Giacinti1 Madeline Jarvis-Cross2 Hannah Lewis3 Jennifer F Provencher1 Yohannes Berhane4 Kevin Kuchinski5 Claire M Jardine6 Anthony Signore4 Sarah C Mansour5 Denby E Sadler3 Brian Stevens6 Natalie A Prystajecky5,7 Sailendra N Sarma1 Davor Ojkic8 Gabrielle Angelo P Cortez5 Marzieh Kalhor5 Ethan Kenmuir5 Christopher M Sharp3
Affiliations 8 institutions
  1. Ecotoxicology and Wildlife Health Division, Science and Technology Branch, Environment and Climate Change Canada, Government of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
  2. Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Toronto, Canada.
  3. Ontario Region Wildlife and Habitat Assessment Section, Canadian Wildlife Service, Environment and Climate Change Canada, Government of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
  4. National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Government of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
  5. Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
  6. Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, Department of Pathobiology, Ontario Veterinary College, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada.
  7. Public Health Laboratory, British Columbia Centre for Disease Control, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
  8. Animal Health Laboratory, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada.
PMID 39640906 2024 One Health eng epublish
PubMed DOI Browse context

Article

Publication summary

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) regularly circulate between wild and domestic bird populations. Following several high-profile outbreaks, highly pathogenic AIVs (HPAIV) with zoonotic potential have been the subject of increasing attention. While we know that HPAIV is transmitted between domestic birds, wildlife, and the environment, little is known about persistence and spillover/back at these interfaces. We integrated the test results of samples collected on and around an infected domestic poultry premise (IP) where H5N1 HPAIV was confirmed in a flock of poultry in 2022 in Southern Ontario, Canada to explore the transmission cycle of AIVs in wildlife and the environment. We sampled a captive flock of Mallards (<i>Anas platyrhynchos</i>) that resided on site, sediment samples collected from water bodies on site, and examined samples collected through surveillance within a 100 km radius of the IP from live wild ducks and sick and dead wildlife. We found serologic evidence of H5 exposure in the captive mallards that resided on site despite no evidence of morbidity or mortality in these birds and no PCR positive detections from samples collected at two different timepoints. Genetic material from the same H5N1 HPAIV subtype circulating in the domestic birds and from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses were detected in wetlands on site. The results of live and sick and dead surveillance conducted within a 100 km radius confirmed that the virus was circulating in wildlife before and after IP confirmation. These results suggest that biosecurity remains the most critical aspect of minimising spillover/back risk in a virus that has been shown to circulate in asymptomatic wild birds and persist in the surrounding environment.

Avian influenza virus Canada Domestic poultry Environment H5N1 Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) Mallard Migratory birds Spillback Spillover Wild bird surveillance Wild-domestic interface

Structured evidence records

Evidence records

9 total
Zoonotic Surveillance 3 records
Zoonotic Surveillance Extraction confidence 0.95
Key finding

Surveillance of wild ducks and other wildlife within 100 km of the poultry premise detected H5N1 HPAIV circulation in wildlife before and after infection confirmation.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Location
Canada Southern Ontario, Canada
Supporting text

We sampled a captive flock of Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) that resided on site, sediment samples collected from water bodies on site, and examined samples collected through surveillance within a 100 km radius of the IP from live wild ducks and sick and dead wildlife.

Method
PCR; serology
Sample type
sediment; wildlife samples
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario
Country inferred
Canada
Zoonotic Surveillance Extraction confidence 0.95
Key finding

Serologic surveillance of captive mallards on site showed H5 exposure despite absence of illness or positive PCR results.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Location
Canada Southern Ontario, Canada
Supporting text

We found serologic evidence of H5 exposure in the captive mallards that resided on site despite no evidence of morbidity or mortality and no PCR positive detections from samples collected at two different timepoints.

Method
serology; PCR
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario
Country inferred
Canada
Zoonotic Surveillance Extraction confidence 0.95
Key finding

Environmental surveillance detected H5N1 HPAIV and low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses in wetland sediments near the infected poultry premise.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Host
Not specified
Location
Canada Southern Ontario, Canada
Supporting text

Genetic material from the same H5N1 HPAIV subtype circulating in the domestic birds and from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses were detected in wetlands on site.

Method
PCR
Sample type
sediment
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario
Country inferred
Canada
Reservoir Ecology 2 records
Reservoir Ecology Extraction confidence 0.88
Key finding

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus genetic material and H5 antibodies were detected in captive mallards and environmental samples at a poultry-infected site in Southern Ontario, indicating viral persistence in wild birds and the local environment.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Location
Canada Canada
Supporting text

We sampled a captive flock of Mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) that resided on site, sediment samples collected from water bodies on site, and examined samples collected through surveillance within a 100 km radius of the IP from live wild ducks and sick and dead wildlife. We found serologic evidence of H5 exposure in the captive mallards that resided on site despite no evidence of morbidity or mortality in these birds and no PCR positive detections from samples collected at two different timepoints. Genetic material from the same H5N1 HPAIV subtype circulating in the domestic birds and from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses were detected in wetlands on site.

Method
field sampling; serology; PCR testing; surveillance
Sample type
serum; sediment; environmental samples
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario, Canada
Country inferred
Canada
Reservoir Ecology Extraction confidence 0.85
Key finding

Monitoring around the infected poultry premise showed that H5N1 HPAIV circulated in wild birds before and after domestic outbreaks, suggesting wildlife served as a persistent reservoir contributing to spillover and spillback risk.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Host
Aves
Location
Canada Canada
Supporting text

The results of live and sick and dead surveillance conducted within a 100 km radius confirmed that the virus was circulating in wildlife before and after IP confirmation. These results suggest that biosecurity remains the most critical aspect of minimising spillover/back risk in a virus that has been shown to circulate in asymptomatic wild birds and persist in the surrounding environment.

Method
wildlife surveillance; field sampling
Sample type
wildlife samples
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario, Canada
Country inferred
Canada
Cross Species Transmission 1 records
Cross Species Transmission Extraction confidence 0.90
Key finding

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus circulated between wild birds and domestic poultry in Southern Ontario, indicating interspecies transmission within avian hosts.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Host
Aves Aves
Location
Canada Canada
Supporting text

Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) regularly circulate between wild and domestic bird populations. Genetic material from the same H5N1 HPAIV subtype circulating in the domestic birds and from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses were detected in wetlands on site. The results of live and sick and dead surveillance conducted within a 100 km radius confirmed that the virus was circulating in wildlife before and after IP confirmation.

Method
serologic testing; PCR detection; genetic analysis; wildlife surveillance
Study design
field surveillance
Transmission direction
animal-to-animal
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario, Canada
Country inferred
Canada
Outbreak Investigation 1 records
Outbreak Investigation Extraction confidence 0.80
Key finding

An outbreak of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza was confirmed in domestic poultry in Southern Ontario, Canada in 2022, with subsequent investigation of wildlife and environmental samples revealing virus circulation at the poultry–wildlife interface.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Host
Aves Aves
Location
Canada Southern Ontario, Canada
Supporting text

We integrated the test results of samples collected on and around an infected domestic poultry premise (IP) where H5N1 HPAIV was confirmed in a flock of poultry in 2022 in Southern Ontario, Canada to explore the transmission cycle of AIVs in wildlife and the environment.

Method
field sampling; serology; PCR; genetic analysis; wildlife surveillance
Transmission direction
animal-to-animal
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario
Country inferred
Canada
Outbreak setting
infected domestic poultry premise
Outbreak time
2022
Serological Evidence 1 records
Serological Evidence Extraction confidence 0.88
Key finding

Captive mallards tested seropositive for H5 avian influenza virus, showing prior exposure without active infection.

Virus
IAV
Location
Not specified
Supporting text

We found serologic evidence of H5 exposure in the captive mallards that resided on site despite no evidence of morbidity or mortality in these birds and no PCR positive detections from samples collected at two different timepoints.

Sample type
serum
Spillover Event 1 records
Spillover Event Extraction confidence 0.92
Key finding

Detection of H5N1 HPAIV in wildlife and domestic poultry indicates spillover and spillback between wild birds and poultry in Southern Ontario, Canada.

Virus
IAV H5N1
Host
Aves Aves
Location
Canada Canada
Supporting text

Genetic material from the same H5N1 HPAIV subtype circulating in the domestic birds and from low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses were detected in wetlands on site. The results of live and sick and dead surveillance conducted within a 100 km radius confirmed that the virus was circulating in wildlife before and after IP confirmation.

Method
serology; PCR; genetic detection
Study design
field surveillance
Transmission direction
animal-to-human
Geographic raw
Southern Ontario, Canada
Country inferred
Canada